It has been a couple of weeks of fast and furious developments in the case of Iran’s nuclear program.

The Islamic Republic’s relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as with the West have been under the spotlight in a big way, and have taken twists and turns as well.

The headlines have gone from shocking revelations—including that Iran had a secret enrichment facility hidden in a mountain near its holy city of Qom;  and that according to a leaked secret annex to an IAEA report, Iran already has the ability to make a bomb;  to the fact that Iran the P5+1 or permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, at a meeting in Geneva, have broken their impasse of so many years, basically achieving (in principle anyway) a breakthrough deal that may be the beginning of a solution to the nuclear crisis.

So, is alarm or relief in order? Even the most seasoned observers of this story may have a hard time deciphering where it all stands.

One of the most respected experts on Iran’s nuclear program, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, gave some answers today—or at least put developments in perspective.

He firstly pointed out that things are not always what they seem.  In the midst of the drama which was the discovery of Iran’s hidden uranium enrichment site coupled with President Ahmadinejad’s strong insistence that there would be no discussion of Iran’s nuclear program anymore, it turns out, that secret negotiations between the IAEA, Iran, the U.S., Russia and France were going on, discussions which led to this potential breakthrough deal which would involve putting most of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium to use for very clear ends—sending it abroad for further enriching and encasing in fuel rods which would then be introduced into a plant which makes medical isotopes in Tehran.

This deal—or we should really say potential deal—came as a surprise to many.  Because far from refusing to talk about its nuclear program in Geneva last week,  Iran talked at length about its nuclear program.

But Fitzpatrick pointed out—the devil may be in the details here.  In theory, it allows both sides to save face.  It in fact involves the tacit approval of the international community for Iran to enrich uranium.  And it means the P5+1 doesn’t have to worry about Iran diverting its stockpile of enriched uranium to other uses.  That said, again, the devil here, is will Iran ship the bulk of its stockpile all at once?  Or will it send it bit by bit, meaning it still retains a lot at home?  And with Iran having 1500 kilograms of the material, and enriching 90 additional kilos each month, Iran certainly won’t run out of enriched uranium.

But if a deal is struck, it will be the first deal in a long time.

Fitzpatrick believes that it was a combination of the threat of further sanctions, combined with the legitimacy deficit of the current Iranian government at home, that made the regime want to be seen as successful in this latest engagement with the west.

And Fitzpatrick said if the deal does go through it will be remarkable.  Many believe it is futile to expect Iran to cease enrichment.  But being engaged enough with them to monitor what they are doing with the material is the most reasonable way to control the situation.

Still, about the international community’s broader ability to control the situation, there are plenty of concerns.  IAEA inspectors need much better access to sites, according to the IAEA. And one inspection of the new Qom facility, scheduled for October 25^th, is not enough, according to Fitzpatrick.  That said, in answer to questions about whether Iran has had plenty of time to clean up any potentially daming evidence there, he said, it is most likely there was no nuclear material in the site yet, and it wasn’t operational, so there is not that much to hide beside the layout of the centrifuges—to see if they were for low or high enriched uranium.   But he said, the IAEA has proven to be good at discovering things even after Iran has attempted to paint or cement over.

In terms of how a deal being hammered out between Iran and the P5+1, and particularly the United States, could effect the region, Fitzpatrick believes neighboring Arab states may feel angered that Iran got what it wanted in the end (the right to keep enriching uranium—at least for now) and so they may want to start their own programs.  But those states would be likely to want their own programs if Iran remained defiant so there seems to be no way to make Arab states happy with the situation.

In terms of Israel, the deal, if it is reached with Iran to ship its enriched uranium to Russia and France for formatting for use in its medical isotope reactor, gives Israel some breathing room.  If Iran’s uranium is accounted for, in theory, it is not going into a device that could threaten Israel.

Fitzpatrick thinks it is likely there are other hidden facilities, and even the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency recently said that Iran would open up Qom and other places to inspection.  What he meant by other places is not clear.  But Iran has been found out to have hidded sites for years now.  There is no reason to believe that process is over.

Fitzpatrick gave credit to the Russians for pushing this idea of further enriching and formatting Iran’s stockpile in a controlled way (the medical facility at the end of this all is heavily safeguarded) and to the French who were apparently quite important in unearthing vital information on the site at Qom.

In the end, there is no big rosy picture here, but if this deal for dealing with Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is reached, it may be the least bad option out there, according to Fitzpatrick.